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         The purpose of this thesis is to examine the growing national security threat posed by 
Russia and China’s willingness to exercise 21st century information warfare techniques against 
the United States and its areas of strategic interest. This study will describe the composition of 
these state’s foreign disinformation entities while providing several case studies that display their 
advanced capabilities and the direct effects that each poses on the general public both 
domestically and internationally. To best provide unbiased reporting and accuracy in each 
country’s analysis, this study will rely on the diversified use of  government reports, legal 
documents, academic journals, and news articles. After research into each state, this study will 
conclude with several recommendations for President-elect Joe Biden and his administration. 
Ultimately this study will advance the belief that as the United States changes administration, it 
remains imperative that the federal government acknowledges the growing threat of international 
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Introduction and Overview 
 
Disinformation​ (n.): false information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the planting 
of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth.​1 
- Merriam Webster’s Dictionary 
 
       The democratic system within the United States has thrived thanks to the trust that the 
American voters bestow upon the electoral system. However, in light of events over the past 
decade, we have been witness to the degradation of a fair and just system. Moreover, we have 
become unknowing actors in the complex decades-long rivalry between international 
superpowers — the United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the People's Republic 
of China. Reflecting on the events of the 2016 Presidential Election in the United States, millions 
of American voters became blind victims and aided in carrying out the spread of disinformation 
that originated from the increasingly aggressive international adversaries, who have fueled 
criticism of the United States and its democratic system. Are Russia and China to blame for the 
growing skepticism surrounding the purity and functionality of our system, and are we serving as 
unwitting enablers in advancing the impact of related disinformation campaigns? 
       In the past two decades, we have seen the rise of technology giants, such as Facebook, 
Instagram, and Twitter that have driven a sense of a virtual mutual community among users 
across the globe through social media platforms. However, the rise of these platforms has 
adversely affected the traditional means by which individuals connect with each other, become 
informed, and formulate their opinions on current events. The Pew Research Center, a 
Washington D.C.-based nonpartisan think tank, reported in 2016 that 62% of U.S. adults 
received their news from social media, with 64% of these individuals only getting news from one 
1 “Definition of Disinformation,” Merriam-webster.com (​Merriam-Webster​, 2019), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disinformation. 
4 
given social media platform.​2​ The growing reliance on social media has directly affected the 
news industry, as early to middle stage media outlets are being forced to shut down or merge 
with the big-name networks that control the industry.​3​ As we see titans of the industry, such as 
CNN or Fox News, relentlessly strive to extend their brands’ reach across these platforms, we 
have seen a rise in subjective reporting. These outlets deviate from the traditional nonpartisan 
and objective reporting strategy, thus creating a population of users that are increasingly 
polarized. 
President Obama and Social Media Campaigning 
       Beginning in 2008, Barack Obama as a Presidential candidate paved the way for 
implementing social media strategy into politics. According to the Pew Internet and American 
Life Project, 2008 was the first year “that more than half [of] the voting-age population used the 
internet to connect to the political process during an election cycle.”​4​ While the study shows that 
Republican voters were more likely to be users of the internet due to education and income 
levels, the Obama voters had cultivated the concept of online political activism.​5​  The 2008 
election had figuratively opened the floodgates to a reshaped strategy behind 21st-century 
politics in the face of a social media-dominated era. Subsequently, we can see how this 
developing political strategy has fueled a growing divide between the two major political parties 
— the Republicans and the Democrats. This divide is continuously exacerbated by the media 
2 ​Jeffrey Gottfried and Elisa shearer, “​News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016​,” Pew Research Center’s 
Journalism Project, December 27, 2017, 
https://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/. 
3 ​David Shimer, ​Rigged : America, Russia, and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral Interference​ (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 246. 
4 ​Aaron Smith, “​The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008​,” Pew Research Center: Internet and Technology (Pew 




titans of the industry, who flood the social media timelines of their users with subjective 
opinion-driven articles that aggressively attack the opposing view. 
Origins of Mass Media and Disinformation 
         While 21st-century technology platforms that have capabilities of reporting news have 
become undoubtedly linked to politics during the rise of the ‘Information Age’, it is important 
that we understand that manipulation of this decade’s long relationship between politics and 
reporting has long been exploited by state-backed entities to promote disinformation campaigns 
across domestic and international communities.​6​ Scholars often credit the origins of media 
disinformation to the 15th century, with the creation of the Gutenberg Printing Press.​7​ By the 
beginning of the 16th century, the church had begun to utilize this technology for mass 
publication and by the beginning of the 17th century, the first widespread international 
distribution of newspapers led by independent organizations was documented.​8​ Along with the 
rapid spread of news came the uptick in demands for content and newspapers had begun to be 
overrun with unverifiable stories that ranged from eye witness accounts on sea monsters and 
witches to natural disasters and the church.​9  
         Though there are centuries of documented disinformation campaigns throughout modern 
history, this thesis focuses on the more recent cases of states utilizing disinformation as a means 
to control public narrative and thought. While Germany fell under the rule of ​the Nazi Party 
beginning in the early 19th century, Adolf Hitler had devised the concept of the Reich Ministry 
6 “Definition of Information Age,” Merriam-webster.com (​Merriam-Webster​, 2019), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Information%20Age. 
7 Marina Gorbis, “​Our Gutenberg Moment (SSIR)​,” ssir.org (Stanford Social Innovation Review, March 17, 2017), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/our_gutenberg_moment. 
8 History.com Editors, “Printing Press,” History.com (History.com, May 7, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/topics/inventions/printing-press. 
9 Jacob Soll, “The Long and Brutal History of Fake News,” ​POLITICO Magazine​ (POLITICO LLC, December 18, 
2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-214535. 
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of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.​10​ With the help of this ministry, Hitler successfully 
managed to control and manipulate all forms of state media.​11​ Concurrently, the Soviet Union 
launched its very own disinformation office in 1923, which came at the request of Józef 
Unszlicht, Deputy Chairman of the KGB.​12​ Under this initiative, the KGB was credited with the 
creation of the word ​dezinformatsiya​ which we have come to know as ​disinformation​.​13 
Subsequently, in the decades following, the People’s Republic of China underwent the Cultural 
Revolution under Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China, which aimed to 
erase the “four olds” or the concepts of old ideas, old things, old customs, and old habits.​14​ It was 
under this jarring transition that the People’s Republic of China began an internal campaign on 
rewriting its past so that it could begin to alter the narrative of its future.  
          While the scale of disinformation seen within the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election may be 
alarming to the government of the United States and its citizens, historical context utilization 
allows us to better understand the severity of recent events in relation to the century’s old 
phenomenon. But most importantly, let this serve as a reminder to reflect upon the past with the 
intent of better understanding how to predict the future, so that we may continue to safeguard the 
long-lasting prosperity of our democracy and our great nation as we proceed to enter into the 
unknown.  
10  United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, “Ministry of Propaganda and Public 
Enlightenment,” Ushmm.org (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2019), 
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/ministry-of-propaganda-and-public-enlightenment. 
11 Ibid. 
12  Martin J Manning, Herbert Romerstein, and Martin Manning, ​Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda​, ed. 
James Olson (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 83. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Tillman Durdin, “China Transformed by Elimination of ‘Four Olds’’,’” ​The New York Times​, March 19, 1971, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/19/archives/china-transformed-by-elimination-of-four-olds.html. 
7 
Focus of Thesis  
        The purpose of this thesis is to examine the threat posed by an increase in offensive 
disinformation campaigns by Russia and China which aim to destabilize the international 
community and negatively influence domestic politics in the United States. This thesis provides 
information regarding the domestic systems that enable both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to 
exercise control over mass media with the goal of rewriting the narrative of current events to 
better advance their personal agendas. Through the use of publicly available information, this 
study will bring to light the growing 21st-century threat while offering suggestions for how the 
United States can best proceed in effectively combating it under the Presidency of 
President-elect Joe Biden. 
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Russian Disinformation Efforts 
“We will never know whether the Russian intervention was determinative in such a close 
election. ... What does matter is this: The Russians successfully meddled in our democracy and 
our intelligence agencies have concluded they will do so again.”​15  
-​ Democratic Representative Adam Schiff 
Origins of State-Backed Meddling 
          To better understand the events that have recently unfolded in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
Election, I will begin by isolating the effects of disinformation as fueled only by the Kremlin. 
Reflecting on events prior to 2016, it is worth noting that Russia underwent its own 2012 
Presidential election and for the first time the international community saw Vladimir Putin 
reportedly adopt an aggressive “trolling” campaign against his political opponents in the months 
leading up to the election.​16​ This was a never before seen offensive strategy aimed at utilizing 
“trolls,” or Kremlin-backed accounts, on various social media platforms to persuade voters 
through consistent exposure to state-funded smear campaigns that aimed to delegitimize Putin’s 
opponent, Gennady Zyuganov.​17​ It was through this successful experimentation that the Kremlin 
had realized that the previous strategy of attempting to influence political leaders within the 
United States through mass “phishing” attempts as reported in the years prior to the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election was far less effective than utilizing Kremlin-funded “bots” and “trolls” to 
15 ​Reuters Staff, “Key Quotes from Congress’ Hearing on Russia and the U.S. Election,” ​Reuters​, March 20, 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-factbox/key-quotes-from-congress-hearing-on-russia-and-the-u-
s-election-idUSKBN16R229. 
16 ​Select Committee on Intelligence - United States Senate, “SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 
UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN 
THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION,” ​United States Senate - Intelligence​, vol. Volume 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL 




target and influence American voters.​18​ It was through Putin’s domestic efforts, that the Kremlin 
was able to adopt a more technically advanced playbook as it narrowed its focus on the 
upcoming U.S. election. 
Russia and the 2016 Election 
       And as the 2016 U.S. presidential election took shape, we witnessed a growing domestic 
divide among American voters on certain key topics such as immigration policy, oppression 
against minorities, and second amendment rights. This divide was only fueled by a growing 
vocalization of extreme political views that countered the opposing party’s ideology. These 
polarized posts had higher user interaction rates since they were being circulated by users more 
often, thus making them appear in the social media algorithm as more popular because of users 
supporting or objecting to the extreme content within the post.​19​ We later learned that platforms 
such as Facebook then implemented the practice of data mining to analyze and build refined 
profiles of each user based on how they would interact with the content.​20​ This allowed artificial 
intelligence to feed certain posts to the user based on their unique data metric profiles.​21​ It did not 
take long for private companies and international adversaries to exploit the opportunity to use the 
data profiles gathered on millions of Facebook users and start feeding information into these 
18 ​Marie Baezner and Robin Patrice, “Hotspot Analysis: Cyber-Conflict between the United States of America and 
Russia (Volume 1),” ​Center for Security Studies (CSS)​ (Zürich: ETH Zürich, June 2017), 
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-0
2.pdf. 
19 ​Ivan Garibay et al., “Polarization in Social Media Assists Influencers to Become More Influential: Analysis and 
Two Inoculation Strategies,” ​Scientific Reports​ 9, no. 1 (December 9, 2019): 1–9, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-55178-8. 




polarized “echo chambers,” or like-minded communities that strategically filter opposing views 
through an algorithm.​22 
       As reported by the Senate Committee on Intelligence’s second report on Russian campaign 
interference in 2016, the digital advertising expenses for the 2016 election increased by 789 
percent or $1.4 billion over what had been reported in the 2012 election.​23​ With greater insight 
into the behavioral data on countless social media users, not only did political candidates identify 
an opportunity to advance their unique narratives with the hopes of being elected, but Russia’s 
Internet Research Agency (IRA) also tapped into this information to target voters in an attempt 
to discredit candidates at multiple levels on both sides if they opposed the Kremlin.​24  
       The Kremlin in doing this had identified a critical flaw that tech giants could not mitigate 
and it proved to be an unanticipated threat. As social media became further politicized and used 
by voters for accessing news leading up to the 2016 election, it has exposed a vulnerability that 
allowed the once free flow of information between Americans to become manipulated and 
diluted by those with ill intent in the broader international community.​25​ This paved way for a 
newfound tactic within the art of psychological warfare. As Christopher Wylie, a former 
Cambridge Analytica employee explained, “​If you’re trying to hack a person’s mind, you need to 
identify cognitive biases and then exploit them.”​26​ The Kremlin would prove to do just that by 
introducing a new form of hybrid warfare. 
22 ​Kartik Hosanagar, “Blame the Echo Chamber on Facebook. But Blame Yourself, Too,” ​WIRED​ (WIRED, 
November 25, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-echo-chamber/. 
23 ​Select Committee on Intelligence - United States Senate, “SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 
UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN 
THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION,” ​United States Senate - Intelligence​, vol. Volume 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS (Washington D.C.: United States Senate, 2019), 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf. 
24 ​Ibid.  
25 ​Ibid. 
26 ​Christopher Wylie, ​MINDF*CK : Cambridge Analytica and the Plot to Break America.​ (S.L.: Random House, 
2019). 
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The Design of Russian Disinformation Entities 
       To adopt and successfully implement this strategy of hybrid warfare, the Kremlin undertook 
a two-pronged approach to influence the 2016 election. It focused the first prong on the 
utilization of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), and the second prong relied on the aggressive 
execution by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) cyber units. The IRA 
based out of St. Petersburg had developed a broad “information warfare” strategy as early as 
2014, but this strategy had shifted to support President Trump in the months leading up to the 
election.​27​ The GRU is the foreign military intelligence agency that reports directly to the 
Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff.​28​ Under the operations of the GRU in 
2016 were Units 26165 and 74455, which were cyber operations units that directly targeted the 
computer networks of the presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton.​29​ Through these coordinated 
efforts, the GRU had successfully accessed private information and leaked sensitive information 
that attacked the legitimacy of Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election.​30 
Early Signs of a Growing Russian Threat 
       It is important to note that the offensive cyber operations of the GRU had coincided with 
various meetings between the Russian government and Trump Campaign officials.​31​ While there 
was no substantial evidence that could have established that the Trump Campaign conspired or 
27 ​Robert Mueller III, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election 
(Vol. 1),” ​U.S. Department of Justice Storage​ (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf. 
28 ​Guy Faulconbridge, “What Is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?,” ​Reuters​ (Reuters, October 5, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-gru-factbox/what-is-russias-gru-military-intelligence-agency-idUS
KCN1MF1VK. 
29 ​Robert Mueller III, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election 





coordinated with the Russian government in the state-sponsored actions aimed at disrupting the 
2016 election, it is worth noting that the Kremlin had a clear bias in favor of Donald Trump 
which dated back to as early as 2015.​32​ This begs the question of whether the Kremlin had an 
authentic existing respect towards President Trump or if the Kremlin had early on identified an 
opportunity to utilize the controversial relationship with President Trump to further sow discord 
among the American people. 
       Before 2016, the United States had been aware of a growing cyber threat from opposing 
powers such as Russia. As noted within the Director of National Intelligence’s 2015 Worldwide 
Threat Assessment, the United States knew that Russia was gaining confidence in utilizing 
information warfare to combat the spread of democratic ideology and influence in the 
international community as top officials saw in Ukraine.​33​ However, the United States did not 
adequately prepare for the sophisticated disinformation capabilities of the Russian state, which 
primarily targeted the American voters rather than the infrastructure of the polls or networks of 
politicians. Sources report that as early as 2014, the Obama administration had received 
preemptive warning about a growing threat posed by the growing offensive capabilities of the 
Kremlin, however, the State Department feared the potential retaliation that would follow from 
taking a more aggressive counter to the growing threats.​34​ A former official of the Obama 
administration noted that there were several options under consideration to convey a strong 
message of condemnation to the Kremlin.​35​ However, these options failed to be further pursued 
32 ​Ibid. 
33 ​James R Clapper, “Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 
Senate Armed Services Committee,” ​Office of the Director of National Intelligence​ (Washington D.C.: Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2015), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf. 
34 ​Ali Watkins, “Obama Team Was Warned in 2014 about Russian Interference,” ​POLITICO​ (POLITICO LLC, 
August 14, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/14/obama-russia-election-interference-241547. 
35 ​Ibid. 
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out of fear for the safety of diplomatic staff and defense attaches rather than the intelligence 
operatives who would be carrying out a majority of the proposed actions.​36 
The Aftermath of 2016  
       While the extent to which the Kremlin meddled in the 2016 United States presidential 
election can not be decisively quantified, it can be confidently argued that there was significant 
meddling within the electoral process. For example, “In 2016, Russian agents posted just under 
30,000 times on Facebook, yet the operation generated almost 13 million shares, 15 million likes, 
and 1.3 million comments, according to a research team at Oxford University.”​37​ And they 
displayed disinformation material directly on the Facebook timelines of over one-third of the 
U.S. population or 126 mill​ion users, according to the testimony by Facebook’s general 
counsel.​38​ Additionally, Twitter reported, “that in the 10 weeks before the election some 3,814 
Internet Research Agency accounts interacted with 1.4 million people,” and an additional 50,528 
automated bot accounts had tweeted regarding the election which could have reached an even 
broader audience.​39​ ​It is important to keep in mind that the above statistics are limited to the 
reach of disinformation on Facebook and Twitter, and evidence suggests that the Kremlin 
launched similar campaigns across various other platforms such as Instagram and YouTube. 
36 ​Ibid. 
37 ​Philip Elliott, “The Mueller Report Doesn’t Call Into Question Trump’s 2016 Win,” ​Time​ (TIME USA, April 18, 
2019), https://time.com/5573537/mueller-report-russia-election-interference/. 
38 ​Elizabeth Weise, “Russian Fake Accounts Showed Posts to 126 Million Facebook Users,” ​USA TODAY​ (USA 
TODAY, October 30, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/10/30/russian-fake-accounts-showed-posts-126-million-facebook-users/8
15342001/. 
39 ​Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far (Published 




       However, the Kremlin’s support of international disinformation campaigns has not stopped 
at the 2016 presidential election. The Department of Justice continues to unravel various pieces 
of evidence that point towards a continuation of these campaigns, despite several notable 
indictments of Russian nationals and Russian entities.  
       In 2018, the Department of Justice indicted Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, a Russian 
national charged with aiding a possibly state-backed aggressive disinformation media campaign 
during the 2016 presidential elections and beyond. This became officially known as “Project 
Lakhta”.​40​ It is important to note that Elena Khusyaynova had received funding from Yevgeniy 
Viktorovich Prigozhin, a close ally of Vladimir Putin, who funded the infamous Internet 
Research Agency (IRA).​41​ It is noted by Yevgeny Vyshenkov, an affiliate of Prigozhin that, 
“Yevgeny Prigozhin believes he is the Czar’s right hand.”​42​ Within the official complaint, the 
Department of Justice provides evidence for continued social media influence between 
December 2016 and May 2018.​43​ The evidence shows several attempts by the conspirators to 
target radical groups through social media campaigns that manipulated the narratives of various 
societal topics within the United States.​44  
       In order to lend credibility to the conspirators who aimed to target American social media 
users, the conspirators behind Project Lakhta had covertly adopted falsified personas of 
40 ​United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, ​United States of America v. ELENA 
ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA​ (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28, 
2018). 
41 ​Amanda Macias and Mike Calia, “Trump Administration Sanctions ‘Putin’s Chef,’ Other Russians over 2016 
Election Hacking,” ​CNBC​ (CNBC LLC, March 15, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/15/treasury-sanctions-putins-chef-other-russians-over-cyber-related-threats.html. 
42 ​Thomas Grove, “Kremlin Caterer Accused in U.S. Election Meddling Has History of Dishing Dark Arts,” ​Wall 
Street Journal​, February 16, 2018, sec. US, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kremlin-caterer-accused-in-u-s-election-meddling-has-history-of-dishing-dark-arts-15
18823765. 
43  United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, ​United States of America v. ELENA 
ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA​ (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28, 
2018). 
44 Ibid.  
15 
American activists.​45​ It was through these accounts that conspirators had utilized advanced 
analytic products to target users with aggressive social media advertising campaigns.​46​ The 
intricacy behind Project Lakhta went as far as to acquire U.S. based computer network space in 
order to utilize virtual private networks (VPN’s) that would allow for the specialists to access the 
U.S. network from anywhere in the world.​47​  The funds required to launch such a large scale 
offensive campaign were managed by Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, who sat at the center of 
this particular Department of Justice led investigation and indictment.​48​ The evidence suggests 
that Khusyaynova requested the necessary funds for Project Lakhta from Concord Management 
and Consulting, an organization owned by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin.​49​ It was through 
these requests that Concord affiliates wired vague or misrepresented funds directly to 
Khusyaynova for Project Lakhta.​50  
       The U.S. Department of Justice had earlier indicted Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin on 16 
February 2018 under the rule of a grand jury for his involvement with Project Lakhta and 
45 ​Ibid. 
46 ​Ibid​. 
47 ​United States District Court for the District of Columbia, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  v. INTERNET 
RESEARCH AGENCY LLC * A/K/A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A/K/A * GLAVSET LLC A/K/A MIXINFO * LLC 
A/K/A AZIMUT LLC A/K/A * NOVINFO LLC, * CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND * CONSULTING LLC, * 
CONCORD CATERING, * YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH * PRIGOZHIN, * MIKHAIL IVANOVICH 
BYSTROV, * MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK * A/K/A MIKHAIL ABRAMOV, * ALEKSANDRA 
YURYEVNA * KRYLOVA, * ANNA VLADISLAVOVNA * BOGACHEV A, * SERGEY PAVLOVICH 
POLOZOV, * MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA * A/K/A MARIA ANATOLYEVNA * BELYAEVA, * 
ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA, * DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY * ASLANOV A/K/A JAYHOON * 
ASLANOV A/K/A JAY ASLANOV, * VADIM VLADIMIROVICH * PODKOPAEV, * GLEB IGOREVICH 
VASILCHENKO, * IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, * and * VLADIMIR VENKOV. (United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia February 16, 2018). 
48  United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, ​United States of America v. ELENA 
ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA​ (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28, 
2018). 
49 ​Neil MacFarquhar, “Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as ‘Putin’s Cook,’” ​The 
New York Times​, February 16, 2018, 
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Concord Management and Consulting.​51​ The evidence obtained by the Department of Justice 
shows that by 2016, Concord Management and Consulting was funding the operating expenses 
of Project Lakhta with a monthly budget of over 1,250,000 U.S. Dollars.​52​ These funds fueled the 
rapid circulation of disinformation across American social media platforms, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, with ease. However, despite his indictment, Prigozhin remains an unmanaged threat 
and resides within the borders of Russia.  
President Trump’s Response to Russia 
        As the U.S. Department of Justice continues to utilize evidence from the U.S. Intelligence 
Community that links offensive acts carried out on behalf of Russian agents, oligarchs, and 
officials, Vladimir Putin vehemently has condemned on multiple occasions the claim of Russian 
interference in the 2016 election. During an interview with Fox News anchor Chirs Wallace, 
Putin stated, “Do you really believe that someone acting from the Russian territory could have 
influenced the United States and influenced the choice of millions of Americans? This is utterly 
ridiculous.”​53​ The consistent denial of involvement by Putin has only been supported by the 
remarks of President Trump, as seen during a moderated discussion in Helsinki, Finland when 
the President states, “My people came to me — Dan Coats came to me and some others — they 
51 Ibid. 
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said they think it’s Russia.  I have President Putin; he just said it’s not Russia. I will say this: I 
don’t see any reason why it would be…”.​54​ These remarks provide a harsh contrast to the 
consistent stance of the U.S. Intelligence Community and undoubtedly has led to the creation of 
tension between the President, his security advisers, and the American people.  
       However, after an outcry by Democratic Party leaders for a lack of response by President 
Trump for Russian interference during the 2016 election, in March of 2018, the Treasury 
Department had placed sanctions on 24 Russian entities and individuals.​55​ However, critics of the 
President remained upset by the failure to acknowledge Russian interference in 2016. Chuck 
Schumer, Senate minority leader, was quoted saying, “I say to President Trump, your silence 
speaks on this issue.”​56 
Russian Efforts Ahead of the 2020 Election 
       Given the lack of direct repercussions imposed on Russia for its attempt to influence the 
2016 election, many expected to see the Kremlin display a willingness to further push the limits 
of what the U.S. government will tolerate. Beginning in February of 2018, Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson provided a warning on early-stage Russian interference within the upcoming midterm 
elections.​57​ In July of 2018, Microsoft went public with evidence showing Russian hackers had 
54 ​President Trump Vladimir Putin, Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in 
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attempted to launch a phishing page that targeted three congressional candidates.​58​ And in 
December of 2018, Dan Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, conducted an investigation 
that concluded that Russia, alongside China and Iran, had successfully conducted influence 
campaigns during the 2018 midterm elections.​59​ The actions taken by the Kremlin during the 
midterm elections were similar tactics to those of the 2016 election in terms of the 
disinformation strategy implemented across social media platforms.  
        More recently, there has been evidence that suggests that the ​IRA, which is linked to 
Yevgeny Prigozhin, remains active ahead of the 2020 Presidential election. Upon receiving a tip 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Facebook and Twitter uncovered several fake accounts 
that were directing users to a news site by the name of Peace Data, which was fed by Russian 
disinformation efforts.​60​ However, this time the Russians had contracted out unwitting freelance 
American writers to create the news articles which were being published.​61​ While this attempt 
was intercepted by the U.S. government early on, it shows that the Kremlin has adopted a new 
approach to disinformation and it is attempting to direct social media users to state-backed 
“fringe websites” rather than solely relying on traditional social media posts.​62​ This proves that 
the threat of disinformation is continuing to evolve and further suggests the need for enhanced 
preventive measures to combat any offensive actions taken by a foreign adversary, such as 
Russia, prior to the 2020 election.  
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        In months leading up to the 2020 election, however, a whistleblower complaint by Brian 
Murphy, the former head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, disclosed on several 
occasions that there was attempted censorship of intelligence analysis relating to the Russian 
interference efforts.​63​ Murphy outlines an instance in which David Glawe, the Special Assistant 
to the President and Senior Director for Homeland Security, had testified in 2018 on the matter 
to the House Committee on Homeland Security, but was then summoned to the White House and 
threatened to be fired by Secretary Nielsen at the orders of President Trump.​64​ However, Glawe 
had managed to restore relations and return to his role but conveyed to Murphy that he would no 
longer be assisting him in matters that regard to Russian interference assessments.​65  
         In May 2020, Chad Wolf, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, was notified by 
Robert O’Brien, White House National Security Advisor, to have Brian Murphy shift his efforts 
from reporting on Russian interference to interference by China and Iran.​66​ However, after 
continuing to report on Russian disinformation, Murphy was told by Wolf in a closed-door 
meeting to hold back further reports as this topic “made the President look bad”.​67​ Afterward, 
Murphy asserts that he was excluded from future briefings and a leaked analysis allegedly 
misreported intelligence and downplayed the current threat presented by Russia ahead of the 
election.​68 
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Conclusion 
       As the United States 2020 presidential election is underway, the public is now aware of the 
existing disinformation and cyber threat capabilities of opposing superpowers such as Russia and 
China. However, many remain skeptical of our preparedness given the postponement of the 
Director of National Intelligence’s Worldwide Threat Assessment, which typically outlines 
high-level initiatives and assessments set forth by the U.S. Intelligence Community. To 
complicate any preexisting threat of foreign adversaries targeting the 2020 United States 
presidential election, we are now working to combat an unprecedented global pandemic 
stemming from the virus, COVID-19. 
       Since the conclusion of the 2016 presidential election, we have undoubtedly experienced the 
continuation of an advancing polarization between the two major political parties and their 
followers within the United States. And this growing divide has only been amplified by the rise 
of the ‘Information Age’ and the growing user interaction across all major social media 
platforms.​69​ As we continue to see an upward trend in the percentage of Americans who turn to 
social media to formulate their views and voice their opinions, are we willingly serving as 
accomplices in our adversaries’ pursuit to delegitimize the western democratic system?  
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Chinese Disinformation Efforts 
“They’re calculating. They’re persistent. They’re patient. And they’re not subject to the 
righteous constraints of an open, democratic society or the rule of law.”​70 
- Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Origins of State-Backed Meddling 
       ​The increase in disinformation campaigns can not be solely attributed to the Russian 
government, as we have recently begun to see the Chinese government follow suit in particular 
since 2016. Reflecting on the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is important to 
note that the Chinese government has been controlled by the Chinese Community Party (CCP) 
since its creation in 1949.​71​ Since then, the state has clearly placed its focus on establishing a 
firm hold over three main pillars: “control of personnel, propaganda, and the People’s Liberation 
Army”.​72​ While the significant efforts directed towards controlling these three pillars have 
shaped the day-to-day functionality of the Chinese domestic politics, it has arguably distorted the 
party’s view on how to effectively cultivate respect in the international community. However, 
can the party’s long-standing domestic agenda be solely to blame for what appears to be 
increasingly aggressive offensive actions taken in the international community on behalf of the 
Chinese state?  
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China’s Growing Admiration Towards Russia 
        Over the course of the past five years, we have seen evidence that suggests a growing 
willingness of the Chinese government to exert overt and covert influence over territories that 
share a special relationship with the mainland, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. Leading up to 
these questionable cases there has been both a rise in Russian disinformation campaigns and 
information warfare toward the Western world and a continued rapid development in relations 
between the Russian government and the Chinese government. As noted by Chinese President, 
Xi Jinping, ahead of a visit to Russia in July of 2019, “I have had closer interactions with 
President Putin than with any other foreign colleagues. He is my best and bosom friend. I cherish 
dearly our deep friendship."​73​ Recently, the two countries have  conducted several joint military 
training exercises with the most recent taking place in September of 2020 in southern Russia, just 
weeks before the U.S. Presidential Election and during the midst of the growing global 
pandemic.​74​ The strengthening of the Chinese and Russian relationship has brought about several 
notable concerns from political figures and academics alike, which can be captured by the 
remarks of Thomas Joscelyn of the Foundation for Defense of Democracy, “the Xi-​Putin 
partnership is arguably the most dangerous relationship on the planet today.”​75 
       While at first glance it may appear that these two countries are focused on two different 
political agendas which could possibly limit a future need for international cooperation between 
the two states, this is not necessarily the case. If we draw our attention to the aspirations of these 
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two superpowers when it comes to 21st-century foreign affairs, we can identify a mutual desire 
to diminish the standing of the United States in hopes of restoring the previously held respect 
among their given geopolitical spheres of influence. As identified within the Secretary of 
Defense’s annual report to Congress on the military and security developments of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC’s), it is stated that PRC has set forth a strategy that is focused on “the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049.​76​ One of the ways that the state has recently 
evolved to achieve this ambitious goal is by the adoption and aggressive implementation of a 
“sharp power” approach, a term which has been coined by the National Endowment for 
Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies.​77​ This term can be defined as, “an 
approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship and the use of 
manipulation to degrade the integrity of independent institutions.”​78​ While the CPP has managed 
to assert its influence over the flow of information domestically, it now seeks to aggressively 
expand its state-led censorship and manipulative disinformation capabilities to the international 
community, similar to Russia. In doing so, the CCP aims to condition the minds of foreign 
entities into accepting the altered narrative that originates from the party leadership in Beijing.​79 
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With control over the foreign perspective and the financial means to influence global markets, 
the PRC has begun to establish itself as a global leader.​80  
       However, the PRC realizes that in order to advance its desired standing within the 
international community, it must further destabilize the country that is currently limiting its 
ability to be seen as the top superpower, the United States. And in the year of a growing global 
pandemic and the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, China has proven eager to jump at the 
opportunity to further expose an existing domestic vulnerability among the American people 
with the hopes of discrediting Western democracy, similar to Russia. However, the CCP’s 
approach differs from that of the Kremlin, as the U.S. Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence has identified that China prefers the election of Democratic nominee and former 
Vice President Joe Biden, who offers a chance at moderating current Trump-backed criticisms 
against the PRC.​81​ While the CCP has made its presidential preferences clear, it can be argued 
that the PRC benefits from launching disinformation campaigns in support of, or against, both 
sides.​82​ As stated by a notable Chinese-American, Pastor Bob Fu, who recently has found 
himself facing death threats from supporters of the CCP, “With such a large-scale disinformation 
campaign, you don’t really have to think of this as beneficial to either candidate. The information 
operation is meant to cause confusion and chaos for the American electorate and hurt both 
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sides.”​83​ If this is indeed representative of the CCP’s strategy, it displays Beijing's 
forward-thinking in shaping the future of great power politics.​84  
China’s Disinformation Entities 
        In order to best understand the forms in which the PRC is implementing its sharp power 
approach, it is important to understand the state-backed entities that serve as the driving force 
behind domestic and international information campaigns. Similar to the Russian military's Main 
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), the PRC has established the People’s 
Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF holds the Network Systems 
Department which is largely responsible for the PRC’s “cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, 
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare” operations carried out against foreign entities.​85​ It 
is worth noting that the SSF is the only known psychological warfare focused entity within the 
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA).​86​ With this knowledge, the U.S. Department of Defense has 
defined the intent of the PLA’s psychological operations mission as one that aims to disrupt and 
influence the public narrative of the international community with the intent of advancing the 
interests of the PRC.​87 
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China and the Fight to Control Hong Kong 
        Considering the recent events that have taken place in Hong Kong in mid to late 2019, there 
is an apparent state-sponsored suppression of the citizens’ and reporters’ voices across several 
virtual domains. The unrest in Hong Kong began in June of 2019 as plans of an extradition bill 
came to light, which would allow for citizens of Hong Kong to be extradited to mainland China 
for legal prosecution.​88​ Protesters feared that this would give China the ability to assert control 
over a semi-autonomous territory, which is currently identified as the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC.​89​ Following July 1, 1997, China was once again 
granted sovereignty over Hong Kong by the British after the signing of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong.​90​ However, in return for the PRC’s resumed 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, the PRC agreed to abide by the Basic Law which outlines the 
concept of ‘one country, two systems’ and provides a constitutional framework to preserve the 
freedoms of Hong Kong’s governing body and its people.​91​ However, in light of recent events, 
the people of Hong Kong feel that the mainland is trying to exercise unlawful influence over its 
unique system.  
        These fears had motivated hundreds of thousands of citizens to take to the streets of Hong 
Kong. After weeks of unrest, Hong Kong’s legislature had decided to officially withdraw the 
highly debated extradition bill.​92​ However, citizens continued to take to the streets with the “five 
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demands, not one less” campaign that aimed to promote further pro-democratic reform within the 
HKSAR.​93​ After several violent clashes between protesters and law enforcement, Yang Guang, a 
spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the Chinese government, promoted 
the protestors as “brazen, violent and criminal actors”.​94​ Which was then followed by an implicit 
verbal warning from Beijing that urged protestors to not underestimate the strength and power of 
the central government.​95 
          With the hopes of controlling the narrative of events unfolding in the HKSAR, the PRC 
took an aggressive two-pronged disinformation approach that aimed to control the way in which 
the citizens within mainland China and the international community perceived the ongoing 
events. When it came time to execute this particular disinformation campaign domestically, it 
was executed with ease due to the fact that the party has blocked access to Twitter, Facebook, 
and Google for the mainland citizens of the PRC.​96​ Consequently, the citizens are limited to the 
news that is shared on the state-backed platforms, Weibo, which is supposed to replicate a more 
censored version of Twitter, and WeChat, which is aimed at replicating a popularized Facebook 
application by the name of WhatsApp.​97​ It is through these platforms that the CPP managed to 
launch several campaigns that villainized the HKSAR protestors and projected them as radical 
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separatists who aimed to degrade the unity of the PRC.​98​ One of the more notable discussion 
threads on Weibo was titled “Protect Hong Kong, firmly say no to violence” and this thread 
managed to accumulate over one million comments that largely backed state intervention against 
protestors in the HKSAR.​99 
        However, the PRC aimed to control narrative beyond the state and in order to accomplish 
this, it became clear that these disinformation campaigns would have to be replicated across 
Western social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook. After careful investigation, 
Twitter had reported in an official statement that it had suspended approximately 200,000 
accounts that, “ … were deliberately and specifically attempting to sow political discord in Hong 
Kong, including undermining the legitimacy… of the protest on the ground.”​100​ Of these 
approximately 200,000 Twitter accounts, a minimum of 936 of them had originated from the 
PRC and others likely accessed the platform through VPNs.​101​ Additionally, Facebook had 
reported in an official statement that it had removed 5 Facebook accounts, 3 Facebook Groups, 
and 7 Facebook Pages from the platform due to the posting of disinformation on matters relating 
to Hong Kong and origins that traced back to PRC government officials.​102​ Facebook estimates 
that these Facebook Pages had roughly a combined total of 15,000 followers and that the 
Facebook Groups had a combined total of 2,200 joiners.​103 
         In one final push to control the narrative stemming from events in Hong Kong, the top 
legislature in China had enacted a new national security law for the HKSAR in July of 2020, 
98 ​Lily Kuo, “Beijing’s New Weapon to Muffle Hong Kong Protests: Fake News,” ​The Guardian​ (The Guardian, 
August 11, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/hong-kong-china-unrest-beijing-media-response. 
99 Ibid.  
100  Twitter Safety, “Information Operations Directed at Hong Kong,” ​blog.twitter.com​ (Twitter, August 19, 2019), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_operations_directed_at_Hong_Kong.html. 
101 Ibid.  
102 ​Nathaniel Gleicher, “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior From China,” ​About​ ​Facebook​ (Facebook, 
August 19, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/removing-cib-china/. 
103 Ibid.  
29 
which outlined new guidance for the interpretation and punishments of crimes that can be 
classified under “secession”, “subversion”, “terrorism” and “collusion with foreign forces.”​104 
The new national security law placed on the HKSAR comes at a time of uncertainty as clashes 
between protestors and state police forces continue to rage on in the city.​105​ In the eyes of Jeff 
Wasserstrom, a historian of modern China at the University of California, Irvine, this move 
further endangers the sovereignty of the territory, as police forces have been presented with an 
even greater degree of autonomy to move forward with unlawful arrests of those who speak out 
against the PRC and CPP.​106​ Consequently, it can be predicted that this will only further limit the 
freedom of speech of citizens across verbal and electronic mediums due to an increased fear of 
repercussion for voicing personal views. In response to the passing of this legislation, President 
Trump signed Executive Order 13936 which authorized the U.S. Government to impose 
sanctions on those responsible within PRC for passing the national security law, as this act has 
been perceived as a threat to the autonomy of the HKSAR and the national security of the United 
States.​107 
Chinese Disinformation During a Global Pandemic 
         The widespread disinformation campaigns as seen within the cases of Hong Kong 
(HKSAR) and Taiwan serve as an alarming glimpse into the advancing capabilities of the PRC 
and arguably offer a grim warning to those who sit in the crosshairs of the party, such as the 
United States. As we find ourselves amidst a growing global pandemic, we have seen the rapid 
104 ​Anthony Kwan / Stringer, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law: 10 Things You Need to Know,” 
www.amnesty.org​ (Amnesty International, July 17, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/. 
105 ​William Yang, “How China’s Influence Is Changing Hong Kong Protests | DW | 07.09.2020,” ​DW.COM​ (DW, 
July 9, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-influence-changing-hong-kong-protests/a-54842597. 
106 Ibid. 
107 ​Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, “China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress” 
(Washington D.C.: ​Congressional Research Service​, August 3, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46473.pdf. 
30 
degradation of international relations, with respect to China, due to a lack of transparency and 
truth surrounding the origins and reporting of COVID-19.​108  
        Beginning in December, several Chinese doctors had begun to notice a strange occurrence 
of a virus that appeared similar to the earlier outbreak of the SARS-coronavirus epidemic, one of 
which was Doctor Li Wenliang.​109​ As Dr. Li’s worries began to grow, he attempted to share 
precautionary measures with fellow medical professionals.​110​ However, as word of this reached 
government officials, an official investigation was launched and Dr. Li was forced to sign a note 
that urged him to stop spreading false claims with an explicit threat of legal repercussion if these 
demands were not immediately enacted.​111​ After several weeks, Dr. Li had fallen ill and passed 
away from complications caused by COVID-19, the virus that he had originally identified weeks 
prior.​112​ However, prior to his unfortunate passing, Dr. Li had taken to the Chinese social media 
platform, Weibo, to share his story and further prove that the CCP had falsely denied any spread 
of infection across its state-monitored media platforms.​113  
        Additionally, in January of 2020, China purposely withheld and prohibited the disclosure of 
data pertaining to COVID-19 to the World Health Organization (WHO) and instead held an 
abundance of closed door political meetings.​114​ Dr. Gauden Galea, the WHO’s highest-ranking 
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official in China, reported that “… they’re [the Chinese Government] giving it to us 15 minutes 
before it appears on CCTV.”​115  
        And after weeks of developing widespread cases of COVID-19, a top Chinese official, and 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian had made the first notable attempt at deflecting 
responsibility for COVID-19’s proven origins in Wuhan, China.​116​ Within a tweet, Zhao Lijian, 
had raised suspicion to his more than 300,000 followers that the virus may have been brought 
into China from a U.S. Soldier.​117​ These false claims were quickly followed by an aggressive 
push back by President Trump, who notably referred to COVID-19 as the ‘Chinese virus’ across 
several press briefings and tweets.​118​  However, the efforts to rewrite the narrative of pandemic 
proved to be more widespread than the theory promoted by Zhao Lijian, as they continued to 
unfold. The Chinese government has chosen to clearly follow the Russian strategy of 
disinformation by attempting to confuse the general public by promoting differing theories 
across social media platforms and by utilizing state-backed accounts and figures to promote 
these messages to hundreds of thousands of users across the world.​119  
        Beginning in late 2018, there had been only 17 official Chinese diplomatic Twitter accounts 
across the platform but as of early 2020, there had been a sudden 370% growth in this number, 
115 ​The Associated Press, “China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO,” ​AP NEWS​ (The 
Associated Press, June 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/3c061794970661042b18d5aeaaed9fae. 
116 ​Ben Westcott Westcott and Steven Jiang, “Chinese Diplomat Promotes Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory,” ​CNN 
(CNN, March 13, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/13/asia/china-coronavirus-us-lijian-zhao-intl-hnk/index.html.​ ; ​Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. 
Dany Shoham, “Where Did COVID-19 Really Come From?,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies 
(Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, July 28, 2020), 
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/covid19-origin/. 
117 ​Ben Westcott Westcott and Steven Jiang, “Chinese Diplomat Promotes Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory,” ​CNN 
(CNN, March 13, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/13/asia/china-coronavirus-us-lijian-zhao-intl-hnk/index.html. 
118 ​Lily Kuo, “Trump Sparks Anger by Calling Coronavirus the ‘Chinese Virus,’” ​The Guardian​, March 17, 2020, 
sec. World news, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/17/trump-calls-covid-19-the-chinese-virus-as-rift-with-coronavirus-b
eijing-escalates.  




marking over 80 official Chinese diplomatic accounts on the platform.​120​ Evidence suggests that 
there could be a correlation in this sudden sharp growth to a meeting held on February 3rd, 2020 
by Chinese President, Xi Jinping.​121​ It had been reported that one of the major talking points 
within this meeting focused on crafting a strategy for publicizing a narrative that highlighted the 
state’s unity in the face of the growing pandemic.​122​ In the months following this meeting, 
Twitter experienced a surge in accounts that aimed to spread pro-Chinese disinformation across 
the platform and this consequently led to an investigation that successfully identified over 23,750 
highly engaged state-backed accounts that were responsible for collectively tweeting 348,608 
times.​123  
         Additionally, U.S. officials have recently grown aware that the PRC has unforeseen 
capabilities that allow for its reach to expand beyond the means of social media as frequently 
seen in past years.​124​ During the early onset of the pandemic, the U.S. Intelligence Community 
had successfully identified that PRC operatives were behind an SMS disinformation campaign.​125 
This campaign targeted a large population of the American public with exaggerated messages of 
a potential nationwide lockdown that would be enforced by the U.S. military.​126​ While the exact 
reach of this campaign remains unreported, it appeared to be widespread enough to invoke a 
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statement refuting the false claims by the White House National Security Council via Twitter on 
March 15, 2020.​127 
         As clearly stated by Xu Zhangrun, a law professor in Beijing, “The coronavirus epidemic 
has revealed the rotten core of Chinese governance.”​128​ The paper which outlines the criticism of 
the party posed by Xu, has since been banned but continues to circulate around the state through 
back-channel means.​129​ Additionally, the disinformation surrounding the origins of COVID-19 
has led more and more political scholars to grow increasingly skeptical over the means by which 
the Xi regime presides over the Chinese people, with most supporting the harsh criticisms of the 
party for recent actions and injustices.​130​ As stated by Shadi Hamid, a contributing writer at ​The 
Atlantic​, “… this pandemic should, finally, disabuse us of any remaining hope that the Chinese 
regime could be a responsible global actor. It is not, and it will not become one.”​131 
China’s Growing Focus on American Politics 
        Concurrently, as the international community faces growing uncertainty surrounding 
COVID-19, it is believed that the risk of foreign interference in the 2020 U.S. Presidential 
election remains heightened. And as the U.S. approached the 100-day countdown leading up to 
November 3rd, U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director, William 
Evanina, issued a statement regarding the Intelligence Community’s commitment to updating the 
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American people of any existing foreign threats ahead of election night.​132​ It was within this 
statement that Director Evanina explicitly identified that the PRC has taken an invested interest 
in shifting their disinformation efforts towards the American people in the months leading up to 
the U.S. Presidential election.​133​ It was approximately three weeks later that Director Evanina 
went on record once again to reaffirm the strong belief that, “China has been expanding its 
influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States, 
pressure political figures it views as opposed to China’s interests, and deflect and 
counter-criticism of China.”​134  
          Reports show that there have already been several attempts made to access information 
and spread disinformation on behalf of the PRC, ahead of Election Day 2020. In early September 
of 2020, Google released statements on a Chinese hackers’ attempt to access the personal email 
accounts of the Biden Campaign on multiple levels.​135​ Later in the same month, Facebook wrote 
in a blog post that it ceased the continuation of an early stage disinformation campaign launched 
by the Chinese in an attempt to influence the political views of American citizens.​136​ While at the 
current moment, evidence supporting this belief is limited due to the timing and the sensitive 
nature of intelligence gathering efforts leading up to the 2020 Presidential election, it is 
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imperative that we as a country identify the developing threat posed by the PRC and face it 
head-on with the full support of the international community. 
           These beliefs have since been echoed by not only top U.S. Intelligence Officials but also 
by the Intelligence Chief of the British Domestic Security Service (MI5), Ken McCallum.​137​ It 
was during Chief McCallum’s first media briefing that he analyzed the Russian and Chinese 
backed disinformation efforts as, “ … Russia was like bad weather but China [is] a far greater 
challenge in the long-term and more like climate change.”​138​ While the level of threat posed by 
the PRC may remain unclear, it is apparent that the narrative posed by the U.S. government has 
appeared to be reciprocated by some of our notable allies across the globe, such as Britain. 
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Conclusion — Evaluating Future Strategies 
“​To make progress, we must stop treating our opponents as our enemy.  We are not enemies. We 
are Americans.”​139 
- President-elect Joe Biden 
Overview of Analysis 
         Moving forward, I will assert that it is in the best interest of the United States government 
and its citizens to act swiftly and decisively in combating the growing threat of disinformation 
enabled by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. As we prepare to turn 
over the United States Presidency to a new administration, under President-elect Joe Biden and 
Vice President-elect Kamala Harris, I will consider proposals for President-elect Biden’s 
Administration, proposals for national security advancement, and proposals for the private 
sector. Given these areas of focus, I will proceed with providing a high-level proposal on how 
each given functional area should focus its efforts in combating disinformation over the coming 
years, with consideration to Russia and China. 
Proposals for President-elect Biden’s Administration 
         As the Trump administration comes to an end and Americans prepare for the inauguration 
of President-elect Joe Biden, the next four years will be critical in terms of the evolution of U.S. 
relations with Russia and China. During the presidential campaign, President-elect Biden 
referred to China’s President as “a thug” during the tenth Democratic Debate in Charleston, 
South Carolina.​140​ Moreover, President-elect Biden remains fairly vocal about his disapproval of 
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recent actions taken by Russian President Vladimir Putin in a variety of spaces from election 
interference to failure to abide by the Open Skies Treaty.​141​ Though President-elect Biden has 
agreed with President Trump’s decision to shift America’s focus from the Middle East to China 
and Russia, he appears to hold back on his plan of action, Biden stated, “… there are a number of 
other important priorities…”​142  
         I suggest that President-elect Biden takes a hard stance on both China and Russia from the 
very start of his time in office, in order to display a clear unwillingness to cooperate with states 
that undermine the United States and its domestic politics. In regards to China, President Trump 
waged a fairly intense trade war with the country that has accumulated over US$550 billion in 
tariffs applied to Chinese goods.​143​ The tensions ignited by large tariff exchanges by both 
countries began to deescalate in early 2020, with the signing of the Phase One Trade Deal.​144 
However, the consequential actions taken against Russia have been less direct in nature. 
President Trump has shown a willingness to impose sanctions on Russia’s elite and to target 
strategic military operations of the state but the President continues to delay other congressional 
sanctions against Russia and avoid placing the blame on the state for aggressive acts in the 
international community.​145​ With this in mind, President-elect Biden has the opportunity to enter 
office with the intent of mending torn economic relations with China and implementing clearer 
rhetoric that shows disapproval for Russia’s recent actions. However, to best execute this agenda 
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of diplomacy, President-elect Biden will need to focus on improving America’s national security 
resources and processes to safeguard the U.S. from any potential future offensive actions taken 
by Russia or China during the course of this transition.  
Proposals for National Security Advancements 
         With the public's growing concern over discerning factual news from foreign 
disinformation aimed at obscuring their perceptions, it is necessary for the U.S. Government and 
national security officials to begin increasing transparency and the rate in which they share 
relevant information on this particular topic with the general public. For instance, there was the 
unfavorable and lengthy delay of the 2020 Worldwide Threat Assessment to the House 
Intelligence Committee from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).​146​ While 
President Trump’s administration has remained silent on commenting on the topic, staffers have 
remarked that the report will not be released for the foreseeable future.​147​ In the face of a highly 
contested 2020 Presidential Election, the general public deserved to know the threats that were 
prevalent especially with respect to foreign disinformation targeting American voters. The divide 
within the flow of information between the federal government and the public must be 
immediately amended, as people have the right to hear an overview of threats that affect their 
daily interaction with news and information. Increased communication would only be beneficial 
in restoring the public's trust in our government and the democratic process.  
         Additionally, the United States government must continue to be proactive in establishing 
entities that can aid us to understand the threat of foreign disinformation and how we can 
improve existing national security agencies' abilities to combat these threats. As we have seen 
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recently, there have been recommendations for the development of a Social Media Data and 
Threat Analysis Center under the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).​148​ The 
development of a center, similar to that which is listed above, could prove invaluable in 
increasing our nation’s cyber capabilities and would reinforce our commitment to combating the 
threat of disinformation. As suggested by Steven Bradley in a PCIO Policy Proposal, our 
government should look further into the formation of a federal commission that is responsible for 
establishing, “… guidelines to govern content moderation efforts by social platform 
operators…”​149​ The federal government and national security agencies should also increase 
collaboration with the private sector in better managing the spread of disinformation 
domestically. 
Proposals for the Private Sector 
          In the months leading up to the U.S. Presidential Election, President-elect Biden did not 
shy away from challenging the alleged lack of action taken when it comes to combating 
disinformation by social media giant, Facebook.​150​ In a tweet, President-elect Biden called on his 
supporters to electronically sign an open letter that was intended for the ​co-founder and Chief 
Executive of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg.​151​ Within this letter, the Biden campaign coined the 
hashtag ​#movefastfixit ​and outlined four key asks: “[to] promote real news, not fake news; [to] 
quickly remove viral misinformation; [to] end the pre-election “lie” period; [and to] enforce 
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voter suppression rules against everyone — even the President.”​152​ Additionally, the letter went 
on to assert the Biden Campaign’s belief that Facebook was blindly making itself vulnerable to 
disinformation campaigns launched by “foreign operatives” as seen in the 2016 election due to a 
lack of preemptive action with only five months remaining before the 2020 election.​153 
          However, one month prior to the election, Facebook stepped up and explicitly exercised its 
ability to slow misinformation and disinformation on a large scale, when it managed to suppress 
the further spread of a controversial New York Post article on Hunter Biden and a series of 
alleged emails.​154​ Additionally, it is worth noting that Twitter had followed within Facebook’s 
actions by also removing the content and citing its “Hacked Materials Policy”.​155​ Facebook went 
on to credit the timely response to its third-party-fact-checking program which has been under 
recent criticism as reports show that this entity had only reviewed 302 pieces of content in the 
month of January 2020.​156​ While it proves to be a step in the right direction for combating this 
growing threat, many still believe that the response was not adequate. According to digital rights 
group Avaaz, the New York Post article still managed to receive 54,115,025 views and 
2,164,601 interactions on Facebook.​157 
         Moving forward, we should adopt the Center for American Progress’s proposed concept of 
‘circuit breakers’ across our social media platforms.​158​ The purpose of this feature would be to 
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aid in the filtering of possible disinformation by temporarily preventing the platform’s algorithm 
to amplify the content in question.​159​ As we have learned, the Facebook algorithm is more likely 
to suggest posts that appear to elicit a reaction, as it places an emphasis on showing posts that 
have larger amounts of likes, comments, and reactions.​160​ With the assistance of this added 
feature, these platforms could potentially scale back the rate at which users are exposed to the 
content that is under review.​161​ Additionally, they could preemptive measures to warn users 
about the accuracy of a given post and guide them to more reliable sources.​162 
         Finally, I support the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s position that we have 
reached a point where we must begin to give a thought as to how to properly foster open 
discussions between our federal government and leading U.S. based social media companies.​163 
With respect to the data privacy concerns of users across these platforms, I suggest the 
facilitation of publicly held discussions that aim to assess and design ways to share data with the 
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threaten our national security and the credibility of our democracy.​164​ With the threat of foreign 
disinformation increasing and the growth of our private sector similarly increasing, it is in the 
best interest of the United States government to tap into existing resources developed by the 
private sector to expedite the development of our federal defensive and offensive capabilities.  
Closing Remarks 
 
          After reflecting on the three broad proposals for President-elect Biden and his 
administration, I would like to bring our attention to the underlying message within these areas 
of focus. Over the course of the past years, we have experienced a growing divide between the 
White House, the defense sector, and the private sector. The effects of this divide have been felt 
not only by our citizens but by the international community. This in return has made the U.S. 
vulnerable. However, regardless of the presidential administration, it is necessary to recognize 
that Russia and China are modernizing their offensive capabilities and agendas at an alarming 
rate. In the future, it will be imperative for Biden to establish fluidity among these three major 
areas of focus to defend against the growing threat of foreign disinformation that aims to 






2020 Biden Presidential Campaign. “MoveFastFixIt.” Joe Biden for President: Official 
Campaign Website. Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign Website, 2020. 
https://joebiden.com/facebook/. 
Albert, Eleanor, Beina Xu, and Lindsay Maizland. “The Chinese Communist Party.” Council on 
Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, June 9, 2020. 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party. 
Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “China Adopts Russia’s Disinformation Playbook.” Axios. Axios, 
March 25, 2020. 
https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-china-russia-disinformation-playbook-c49b6f3b-2a9
a-47c1-9065-240121c9ceb2.html. 
Amnesty International Editor. “Hong Kong Protests Explained.” Amnesty.org. Amnesty 
International, 2019. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained/. 
Baezner, Marie, and Robin Patrice. “Hotspot Analysis: Cyber-Conflict between the United States 
of America and Russia (Volume 1).” ​Center for Security Studies (CSS)​. Zürich: ETH 
Zürich, June 2017. 
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/
pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-02.pdf. 
Bandow, Doug. “Why America Should Fear a Russia-China Alliance.” CATO Institute. CATO 
Institute, September 9, 2020. 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-america-should-fear-russia-china-all
iance. 
Barnes, Julian E. “Russians Tried, but Were Unable to Compromise Midterm Elections, U.S. 
Says (Published 2018).” ​The New York Times​, December 21, 2018, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/us/politics/russia-midterm-election-influence-coate
s.html. 
BBC Editor. “Hong Kong Formally Scraps Extradition Bill That Sparked Protests.” ​BBC News​, 
October 23, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50150853. 
44 
———. “Social Media and Censorship in China: How Is It Different to the West?” Bbc.co.uk. 
BBC News, September 26, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/41398423/social-media-and-censorship-in-china-h
ow-is-it-different-to-the-west. 
———. “The Hong Kong Protests Explained in 100 and 500 Words.” ​BBC News​, November 28, 
2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695. 
BLOOMBERG. “Biden Goes after Facebook on Handling of Disinformation.” Los Angeles 
Times. Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2020. 
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-06-11/biden-goes-after-faceboo
k-on-handling-of-disinformation. 
Bloomberg Politics. “Joe Biden Calls China’s Xi Jinping a ‘Thug.’” YouTube Video. ​YouTube​, 
February 25, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DcMT_QZN2xk.  
Excerpt from the tenth Democratic Debate in Charleston, South Carolina . 
Bradley, Steven. “Securing the United States from Online Disinformation—A Whole-of-Society 
Approach.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, August 24, 2020. 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/24/securing-united-states-from-online-disinform
ation-whole-of-society-approach-pub-82549. 
Brewster, Thomas. “Microsoft: Russian Hackers Are Targeting The Midterms.” Forbes. Forbes, 
July 20, 2018. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/07/20/russian-hackers-target-three-mi
d-term-candidates-says-microsoft/. 
CBS/AP. “China Says It Will Join Russian Military Exercises This Month along with Iran, 
Belarus and Others.” ​Www.Cbsnews.com​. September 10, 2020. 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-russia-military-exercises-war-games-caucasus-202
0-with-iran-belarus-pakistan-myanmar/. 
China Briefing. “The US-China Trade War: A Timeline - China Briefing News.” China Briefing 
News. China Briefing News, August 25, 2020. 
https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/. 
Choi, Christy. “Hong Kong Protesters and Chinese Officials Hold Rival Press Conferences.” The 




Clapper, James R. “Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 
Intelligence Community Senate Armed Services Committee.” ​Office of the Director of 




“Definition of Disinformation.” Merriam-webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2019. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disinformation. 
“Definition of Information Age.” Merriam-webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2019. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/information. 
Durdin, Tillman. “China Transformed by Elimination of ‘Four Olds’’.’” ​The New York Times​, 
March 19, 1971. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/19/archives/china-transformed-by-elimination-of-four
-olds.html. 
Elliott, Philip. “The Mueller Report Doesn’t Call Into Question Trump’s 2016 Win.” Time. 
TIME USA, April 18, 2019. 
https://time.com/5573537/mueller-report-russia-election-interference/. 
EVANIA, NCSC DIRECTOR WILLIAM. “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: 
Election Threat Update for the American Public.” www.dni.gov. Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, August 7, 2020. 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc-di
rector-william-evanina-election-threat-update-for-the-american-public.  
Press Release . 
Evanina, NCSC Director William. “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: 100 Days 





Eversden, Andrew. “Why It’s Difficult to Share Info with Big Tech to Combat Election 
Misinformation.” Federal Times. Federal Times, October 8, 2019. 
https://www.federaltimes.com/congress/capitol-hill/2019/10/09/why-its-difficult-to-share
-info-with-big-tech-to-combat-election-misinformation/. 
Facebook: Help Center. “What Kinds of Posts Will I See in News Feed on Facebook? | Facebook 
Help Center | Facebook.” www.facebook.com. Facebook, 2020. 
https://www.facebook.com/help/166738576721085. 
Faulconbridge, Guy. “What Is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?” Reuters. Reuters, 
October 5, 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-gru-factbox/what-is-russias-gru-military
-intelligence-agency-idUSKCN1MF1VK. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese 
Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States.” Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 7, 2020. 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-
chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.  
Remarks as delivered by Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray . 
Feiner, Lauren. “Read Joe Biden’s First Speech as President-Elect.” CNBC. CNBC, November 
8, 2020. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/07/read-joe-biden-acceptance-speech-full-text.html.  
Pulling quote from President-Elect Biden’s First Speech . 
Frenkel, Sheera, and Julian E. Barnes. “Russians Again Targeting Americans With 




Garibay, Ivan, Alexander V. Mantzaris, Amirarsalan Rajabi, and Cameron E. Taylor. 
“Polarization in Social Media Assists Influencers to Become More Influential: Analysis 
and Two Inoculation Strategies.” ​Scientific Reports​ 9, no. 1 (December 9, 2019): 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-55178-8. 
47 
Gilbert, David. “Facebook Failed Miserably in Its Attempt to Stop the Hunter Biden Story.” 
www.vice.com. Vice Media Group, October 23, 2020. 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/4ady3g/facebook-failed-miserably-in-its-attempt-to-stop
-the-hunter-biden-story. 
Gilsinan, Kathy. “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World.” ​The Atlantic​, May 28, 2020. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-u
nited-states-xi-jinping/612085/. 
Gleicher, Nathaniel. “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior.” Facebook.com. Facebook, 
September 22, 2020. 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-china-phi
lippines/. 
———. “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior From China.” About Facebook. 
Facebook, August 19, 2019. https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/removing-cib-china/. 
Global Times - Xinhua. “Xi Tells Russian Media He Cherishes Deep Friendship with Putin - 
Global Times.” www.globaltimes.cn. Global Times, June 5, 2019. 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1153186.shtml. 
Gorbis, Marina. “Our Gutenberg Moment (SSIR).” ssir.org. Stanford Social Innovation Review, 
March 17, 2017. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/our_gutenberg_moment. 
Gottfried, Jeffrey, and Elisa shearer. “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016.” Pew 
Research Center’s Journalism Project, December 27, 2017. 
https://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/. 
GovHK. “GovHK: Fact Sheets.” www.gov.hk. GovHK, July 2020. 
https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/. 
Greenwood, Max. “Putin Refuses to Look at Mueller Indictment during Fox News Interview.” 
TheHill.com. The Hill, July 16, 2018. 
https://thehill.com/policy/international/397318-putin-refuses-to-look-at-indictment-durin
g-fox-news-interview. 
Grove, Thomas. “Kremlin Caterer Accused in U.S. Election Meddling Has History of Dishing 




Hamid, Shadi. “China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World.” The Atlantic. The Atlantic, 
March 19, 2020. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/china-trolling-world-and-avoiding-bla
me/608332/. 
Hegarty, Stephanie. “The Chinese Doctor Who Tried to Warn Others about Coronavirus.” ​BBC 
News​, February 6, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51364382. 
History.com Editors. “Printing Press.” History.com. History.com, May 7, 2018. 
https://www.history.com/topics/inventions/printing-press. 
Holmes, Aaron. “Fake Text Messages Claiming the US Military Would Enforce a Country-Wide 
Lockdown Went Viral Last Month. They Were Spread by Chinese Agents, According to 
a New Report.” Business Insider, April 22, 2020. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/covid-19-lockdown-text-messages-hoax-spread-by-chin
a-report-2020-4. 
Holmes, Aaron Holmes, and Paige Leskin. “Facebook and Twitter Are Choking the Spread of a 
Controversial New York Post Story about Hunter Biden after Questions Arise about Its 
Veracity and a Possible Disinformation Campaign.” Business Insider. Business Insider, 
October 14, 2020. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-hunter-biden-new-york-post-story-fact-check
ers-2020-10. 
Horsley, Jamie P. “Let’s End the COVID-19 Blame Game: Reconsidering China’s Role in the 
Pandemic.” Edited by James Haynes. Brookings. Brookings, August 19, 2020. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/19/lets-end-the-covid-19-bla
me-game-reconsidering-chinas-role-in-the-pandemic/. 
Hosanagar, Kartik. “Blame the Echo Chamber on Facebook. But Blame Yourself, Too.” 
WIRED. WIRED, November 25, 2016. 
https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-echo-chamber/. 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. “Whistleblower Reprisal Complaint: 
MURPHY, BRIAN PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS.” ​House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence​. Washington D.C.: DEPARTMENT OF 
49 
HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, September 8, 2020. 
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/murphy_wb_dhs_oig_complaint9.8.20.pdf. 
Kharpal, Arjun. “An App That Let Chinese Users Bypass the Great Firewall and Access Google, 
Facebook Has Disappeared.” CNBC. CNBC, October 11, 2020. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/12/chinese-app-that-let-users-access-google-facebook-ha
s-disappeared.html. 
Kristof, Nicholas. “Opinion | ‘I Cannot Remain Silent.’” ​The New York Times​, February 15, 
2020, sec. Opinion. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/opinion/sunday/china-coronavirus.html. 
Kuo, Lily. “Beijing’s New Weapon to Muffle Hong Kong Protests: Fake News.” The Guardian. 
The Guardian, August 11, 2019. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/hong-kong-china-unrest-beijing-media-
response. 
———. “Trump Sparks Anger by Calling Coronavirus the ‘Chinese Virus.’” ​The Guardian​, 
March 17, 2020, sec. World news. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/17/trump-calls-covid-19-the-chinese-virus
-as-rift-with-coronavirus-beijing-escalates. 
Kwan / Stringer, Anthony. “Hong Kong’s National Security Law: 10 Things You Need to 
Know.” www.amnesty.org. Amnesty International, July 17, 2020. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-thi
ngs-you-need-to-know/. 
Lawrence, Susan V., and Michael F. Martin. “China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: 
Issues for Congress.” Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 3, 
2020. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46473.pdf. 
MacFarquhar, Neil. “Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as 
‘Putin’s Cook.’” ​The New York Times​, February 16, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/europe/prigozhin-russia-indictment-mueller.
html. 
Macias, Amanda, and Mike Calia. “Trump Administration Sanctions ‘Putin’s Chef,’ Other 




Manning, Martin J, Herbert Romerstein, and Martin Manning. ​Historical Dictionary of American 
Propaganda​. Edited by James Olson. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 
2004. 
Mueller III, Robert. “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 
Presidential Election (Vol. 1).” ​U.S. Department of Justice Storage​. Washington D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019. https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf. 




Office of the Secretary of Defense. “OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual 
Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 




O’Sullivan, Donie. “Twitter Deletes over 170,000 Accounts Linked to the Chinese 
Government.” CNN. CNN, June 12, 2020. 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/tech/twitter-manipulation-account-removal/index.html. 
People Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region.” www.fmprc.gov.cn. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020. 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/zgjk_665467/3572_665469/t17814.sht
ml. 
RM Staff. “Joe Biden and Kamala Harris on Russia.” russiamatters.org. Russia Matters, 
November 9, 2020. https://russiamatters.org/analysis/joe-biden-and-kamala-harris-russia. 
Rogin, Josh. “Opinion | There’s Chinese Interference on Both Sides of the 2020 Election.” 





Sanger, David E., and Nicole Perlroth. “Chinese Hackers Target Email Accounts of Biden 
Campaign Staff, Google Says.” ​The New York Times​, June 4, 2020, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/politics/china-joe-biden-hackers.html. 
Schor, Elana, Andrew Restuccia, and Cory Bennett. “US Imposes New Sanctions on Russian 
Entities over 2016 Election Meddling.” POLITICO. POLITICO, March 15, 2018. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-russia-us-imposes-new-sanctions-on-over-2
016-election-meddling/. 
Select Committee on Intelligence - United States Senate. “SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES 
CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION.” ​United States 
Senate - Intelligence​. Vol. Volume 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA WITH 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS. Washington D.C.: United States Senate, 2019. 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.  
116th Congress. 
Shane, Scott, and Mark Mazzetti. “The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story 
So Far (Published 2018).” ​The New York Times​, September 20, 2018, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-t
rump-clinton.html?mtrref=www.google.com. 
Shimer, David. ​Rigged : America, Russia, and One Hundred Years of Covert Electoral 
Interference​. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020. 
Shoham, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany. “Where Did COVID-19 Really Come From?” Begin-Sadat 
Center for Strategic Studies. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, July 28, 2020. 
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/covid19-origin/. 
Simpson, Erin, and Adam Conner. “Fighting Coronavirus Misinformation and Disinformation: 
Preventive Product Recommendations for Social Media Platforms.” ​Center for American 





Singer, Natasha. “What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data.” ​The New 
York Times​, April 11, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html. 
Smith, Aaron. “The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008.” Pew Research Center: Internet and 
Technology. Pew Research Center, April 15, 2009. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008/. 
Soll, Jacob. “The Long and Brutal History of Fake News.” POLITICO Magazine. POLITICO 
LLC, December 18, 2016. 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-violent-21453
5. 
Solon, Olivia, and Ken Dilanian. “China’s Influence Operations Offer Glimpse into Information 
Warfare’s Future.” NBC News. NBC News, October 21, 2020. 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/china-s-influence-operations-offer-gli
mpse-future-information-warfare-n1244065. 
Staff, Reuters. “Key Quotes from Congress’ Hearing on Russia and the U.S. Election.” ​Reuters​, 
March 20, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-factbox/key-quotes-from-congress-h
earing-on-russia-and-the-u-s-election-idUSKBN16R229. 
Stanglin, Doug. “Russia Already Meddling in U.S. Midterm Elections, Tillerson Says.” USA 
TODAY. USA TODAY, February 7, 2018. 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/02/07/tillerson-russians-already-meddl
ing-u-s-midterm-elections/314560002/. 
The Associated Press. “China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO.” AP 
NEWS. The Associated Press, June 2, 2020. 
https://apnews.com/article/3c061794970661042b18d5aeaaed9fae. 
The Economist. “China Finds a Use Abroad for Twitter, a Medium It Fears at Home.” The 




The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. “Chinese Communist Party | Political Party, China.” In 
Encyclopedia Britannica​, July 18, 2016. 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party. 
The Standard. “New UK Intel Chief Likens China Threat to Climate Change, While Russia Is 




Turak, Natasha. “Here’s Where Trump Has Been Tough on Russia — and Where He’s Backed 
down.” CNBC. CNBC, July 16, 2018. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/16/heres-where-trump-has-been-tough-on-russia--and-wh
ere-hes-backed-do.html. 
Twitter Safety. “Information Operations Directed at Hong Kong.” blog.twitter.com. Twitter, 
August 19, 2019. 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_operations_directed_at_
Hong_Kong.html. 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  v. 
INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC * A/K/A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A/K/A * 
GLAVSET LLC A/K/A MIXINFO * LLC A/K/A AZIMUT LLC A/K/A * NOVINFO 
LLC, * CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND * CONSULTING LLC, * CONCORD 
CATERING, * YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH * PRIGOZHIN, * MIKHAIL 
IVANOVICH BYSTROV, * MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK * A/K/A 
MIKHAIL ABRAMOV, * ALEKSANDRA YURYEVNA * KRYLOVA, * ANNA 
VLADISLAVOVNA * BOGACHEV A, * SERGEY PAVLOVICH POLOZOV, * 
MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA * A/K/A MARIA ANATOLYEVNA * 
BELYAEVA, * ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA, * DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY 
* ASLANOV A/K/A JAYHOON * ASLANOV A/K/A JAY ASLANOV, * VADIM 
VLADIMIROVICH * PODKOPAEV, * GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO, * 
IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, * and * VLADIMIR VENKOV. (United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia February 16, 2018). 
54 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. United States of America v. 
ELENA ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia September 28, 2018). 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC. “Ministry of Propaganda and 
Public Enlightenment.” Ushmm.org. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2019. 
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/ministry-of-propaganda-and-public-enl
ightenment. 
Vladimir Putin, President Trump. Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the 
Russian Federation in Joint Press Conference. ​The White House​, July 16, 2018. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-puti
n-russian-federation-joint-press-conference/. 
Walcott, John. “The Trump Administration Is Stalling an Intel Report That Warns the U.S. Isn’t 
Ready for a Global Pandemic.” Time. Time, March 9, 2020. 
https://time.com/5799765/intelligence-report-pandemic-dangers/. 
Walker, Christopher. “China’s Foreign Influence and Sharp Power Strategy to Shape and 
Influence Democratic Institutions.” National Endowment for Democracy. National 
Endowment for Democracy, May 16, 2016. 
https://www.ned.org/chinas-foreign-influence-and-sharp-power-strategyto-shape-and-infl
uence-democratic-institutions/. 
Watkins, Ali. “Obama Team Was Warned in 2014 about Russian Interference.” POLITICO. 
POLITICO LLC, August 14, 2017. 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/14/obama-russia-election-interference-241547. 
Weise, Elizabeth. “Russian Fake Accounts Showed Posts to 126 Million Facebook Users.” USA 
TODAY. USA TODAY, October 30, 2017. 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/10/30/russian-fake-accounts-showed-posts-12
6-million-facebook-users/815342001/. 
Westcott, Ben Westcott, and Steven Jiang. “Chinese Diplomat Promotes Coronavirus Conspiracy 




Wong, Edward, Matthew Rosenberg, and Julian E. Barnes. “Chinese Agents Helped Spread 
Messages That Sowed Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say.” ​The New York Times​, April 
22, 2020, sec. U.S. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-disinformation.html. 
Wylie, Christopher. ​MINDF*CK : Cambridge Analytica and the Plot to Break America.​ S.L.: 
Random House, 2019. 
Yang, William. “How China’s Influence Is Changing Hong Kong Protests | DW | 07.09.2020.” 
DW.COM. DW, July 9, 2020. 
https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-influence-changing-hong-kong-protests/a-54842597. 
​ 
 
​ 
 
​ 
​ 
 
56 
